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AbstrAct
This paper attempts to clarify nature of the “law-likness” or “nonaccidentalness” 
that generic sentences are usually claimed to express. It does so by examining 
the interactions of such generic sentences with a construction which seems 
to express “accidentalness,” namely the happens to construction (as in John 
happens not to see well). In particular, it turns out that generics with bare plural 
subjects (BP generics, like Dogs have four legs), but not generics with indeinite 
singular subjects (IS generics, like A dog has four legs) are compatible with this 
construction (compare Dogs happen to have four legs vs #A dog happens to 
have four legs). I analyze happens to as a domain vague necessity operator, 
i.e. a universal quantiier over worlds, whose restriction (the domain of worlds 
quantiied over) is systematically vague. Following Greenberg (2003, 2008) 
I propose that a number of distributional and interpretational differences 
between IS and BP generics can be attributed to the fact that although both 
have the same basic modal quantiicational semantic structure the restriction 
over worlds is necessarily precise in the former kind of generics but is allowed 
to be vague in the latter. The compatibility of BP generics with happens to is 
thus analyzed as a case of modal concord.
Keywords
Genericity, nonaccidentalness, vagueness, modality, indeinite singular, bare 
plural, happens to.
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Introduction
In the literature on genericity, characterizing, (or I-) generic sentences 
are usually assumed to have several core properties: they express quasi-
universal generalizations (unlike e.g. sentences with existential quantiiers), 
tolerate exceptions (unlike sentences with overt universals), express “long 
lasting/temporally stable” statements (unlike temporary or episodic 
sentences) are incompatible with contextual restrictions (unlike sentences with overt quantiiers), and express nonaccidental, law-like generalizations 
(again, unlike sentences with e.g. overt every). This last property is usually 
tested by showing that they support counterfactuals, e.g. (1a) supports (1b):
(1)  a.  Dogs have 4 legs.
 b.  If this were a dog, it would probably have 4 legs as well. 
However, a closer look at the literature reveals that almost all these core properties have been challenged. First, Cohen (2004) convincingly shows that some generics (as in 2B’s response to 2A) do not express “quasi-universal” 
statements, but are rather “existential generics.”
(2)  A:  Birds lay eggs.
 B:  Mammals lay eggs too.
Second, as is well known, there are clear examples of I-generic sentences which do not tolerate exceptions, as in (3):
(3)  a.  Dogs are mammals.
 b.  Bachelors are unmarried men.
Third, as shown in Greenberg (2003), some generics do not express “timeless” 
generalizations, but are rather “episodic generics” (notice that they are indeed 
generic, e.g. they tolerate exceptions, support counterfactuals, etc.):
(4)  a.  Italian restaurants are closed tonight.
 b.  Earthquakes are especially strong today!
Fourth, as illustrated in Condoravdi (1997), Greenberg (2007), along well-
known generics like (5), for which contextual restriction is indeed impossible (Krifka (1987) and Krifka et al. (1995)), we also ind many cases of generics which can be easily contextually restricted. (6) and (7) are examples of such 
cases:
(5)  (Context: There are lions and tigers in this cage)  a.  Every lion is dangerous. (Can mean “Every lion in this cage is dangerous”) b.  Lions are dangerous. (Cannot mean “Lions in this cage are dangerous”)
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(6)   (There are professors and students in this university.) Professors wear a tie. (Can mean “ Professors in this university”) 
(7)  (There are shirts and skirts in this shop.) Shirts cost only 20 NIS. (Can mean 
“shirts in this shop”)
But what about the “nonaccidentalness” of generics? Can this property be 
challenged as well?
In this paper I would like to take an empirical perspective at this 
question, by examining the interaction of generic sentences with an expression 
which seems to express “accidentalness.” There are, in fact, a number of such 
“accidental” particles and constructions, e.g. happens to, it happens to be the 
case that, accidentally, coincidentally, by chance. In this paper I focus on 
happens to (as in John happens to be in Tel Aviv today), and in particular on 
the fact that happens to can felicitously combine with generic sentences, as illustrated in (8), and in the naturally occurring examples in (9):
(8) Dogs happen to have 4 legs
(9) a.  Young children happen to make very good language teachers. 1  b.  Newborn babies happen to be extremely sensitive to colors. 2
 c.  Teenagers happen to be desperate for capital. 3
 d.  Cats happen to be good swimmers—when the need arises. 4
At least on the surface, the felicity of such sentences needs to be explained. 
Intuitively “x happens to have P” says that it is accidental that x has P. For example, a sentence like (10) seems to say that John’s being in Tel Aviv today 
is accidental.
(10)  John happens to be in Tel Aviv today.
But if this is the case, how can happen to felicitously combine with 
a “nonaccidental” generic? Does such a combination cancel the 
“nonaccidentalness” of the generic sentences, and hence renders them nongeneric? And what do such sentences mean? Do they express “accidental nonaccidental generalizations”? “Nonaccidental accidental generalizations”? 
Or perhaps something else?
In the rest of the paper I will attempt to supply answers to these questions. I will argue that sentences as in (8) and (9) are still generic sentences, that their felicity can be explained once the “accidental” lavor of happens to as well as 
the “nonaccidental” nature of generics are correctly and precisely captured, 
1. http://shikokudays.posterous.com/a-somewhat-regular-day2. http://library.thinkquest.org/08aug/01276/colorsandhumans/effectsofcolorsonbabies.html3. http://mustsan.info/2011/10/the-greatest-on-the-net-jobs-for-teens/
4. http://www.cat-lovers-gifts-guide.com/swimming-cats.html
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and more generally that the interaction of genericity and happens to can make 
our understanding of genericity and the accidental/nonaccidental distinction 
sharper and deeper.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 1 I start with some 
observations about the interaction between the happens to operator and genericity. Section 2 deals with happens to in nongeneric statements (John 
happens to be in Tel Aviv today/I happen not to see well). In section 3 I develop a theory of genericity based on Greenberg (2003, 2007), which accounts for 
the similarities and differences between two types of generic sentences, namely those with indeinite singular and with bare plural subjects, respectively. 
Section 4 turns back to the interaction between genericity and happens to (as 
in Dogs happen to have 4 legs), and attempts to account for the observations in section 2. Section 5 summarizes the main claims in the paper and discusses 
some general implications.
1. Combining generics and happen to: some initial observations
We are interested in sentences like the following: 
(11)  a.  Dogs happen to have 4 legs.
 b. Little babies happen to be very cute. c.  Cats happen to be independent. 
Should such sentences still be considered (I-) generic? The answer seems to be positive, as they have all properties of classical generic statements. First, 
such sentences express (quasi) universal generalizations. (11c), for example, 
is clearly a generalization about cats, and should not be paraphrased as (12):
(12)   Some cats happen to be independent.
Second, they tolerate exceptions. (11a), for example, will be true even if we ind some dogs which do not (happen to) have 4 legs. Most importantly, such sentences still seem to support counterfactuals as well. For example, (11a-c) support (13a-c), respectively:
(13)  a.  If this were a dog, it would probably have 4 legs as well.
 b.  If this were a little baby, it would probably be very cute as well.
 c. If this were a cat, it would probably be independent too.
It is important to notice in this respect that these counterfactuals do not contain 
the happens to operator, i.e. (11a-c) support indeed (13a-c), and not (14a-c):
(14)  a.  If this were a dog, it would probably happen to have 4 legs as well.
  b.  If this were a little baby, it would probably happen to be very cute as well.
 c. If this were a cat, it would probably happen to be independent too.
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There may be also cases like (14), though. In the context of (15), for example, the generic in (16) may be taken to support the counterfactual in (17) (following an example in Cohen (2001)):
(15) Scenario: Suppose each and every Supreme Court judge you meet happens to 
have an odd ID number. Judge Smith happens to have an odd ID number, Judge 
Brown happens to have an odd ID number, Judge Jones happens to have an 
odd ID number, etc. At some point, you may conclude that, as strange as it may 
sound, there is a pattern here, which will probably continue beyond the actual 
Supreme Court judges. 
(16)  That’s really strange! Supreme Court judges happen to have an odd ID number!
(17) If Bill were a Supreme Court judge, he would happen to have an odd ID number 
a well.
It seems, then, that generics with happens to are still generic. Notice, though, 
that while this is true for generics with bare plural subjects (BP generics 
henceforth), as in the ones examined above, happens to is not as good or as felicitous in generics with indeinite singular subjects (IS generics, henceforth), as illustrated in the minimally contrasting IS counterparts of (1a-c) in (18a-c):
(18)  a.  #/?? A dog happens to have 4 legs. b.  #/?? A little baby happens to be very cute. c.  #/?? A cat happens to be an independent animal.
This data is supported by results of web searches, in which one can indeed ind 
examples of BP generics with happen to, but no similar IS generics.
We are left, then, with several questions: (a) How can the “accidental” 
happens to combine with “nonaccidental” generics? (b) What do BP generics 
with happen to mean (e.g. why do they support counterfactuals without happen 
to)? And (c) Why aren’t IS generics compatible with happens to as well?
To start answering these questions let us turn now to the semantics of 
happens to in nongeneric, episodic sentences.
2. The interpretation of happens to in nongeneric sentences
We will be concerned with sentences like (19), (20) and (21):
(19)   Our dishwasher happens to be very noisy.
(20)   John happens to run very slowly.
(21)   John happens not to see well.
(21), for example, seems to entail that John does not see well and suggests that 
this is accidental, i.e. it could clearly have been otherwise. Intuitively, such a 
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statement expresses “the opposite” of a sentence with a necessity modal, e.g. (22), where John’s not seeing well is a necessity, which “couldn’t have been 
otherwise”:
(22)  Necessarily, John does not see well.
But, in what way is “accidentalness” as in (21) different from “contingency” as in (23)?
(23)  John does not see well. 
After all, both (21) and (23) are supposed to give us information which is 
restricted to the actual set of circumstances (the actual world), and both are different from the modalized (22). We need, then, to capture the effect that the 
addition of happens to has on the interpretation of a contingent sentence, and 
in attempting to do so several options come to mind.Perhaps the simplest option is to take a sentence like (21) to mean that John’s not seeing well is restricted to the actual world. That is, that John does 
not see well is true in w0 and false in all other worlds. We can immediately see, however, that this option is much too strong. Even if we take (21) to be true 
we can still imagine other possible circumstances, besides w0, where John does 
not see well.A second option is to assume that (21) means that there is no reason causing John not see well, or at least that no such reason is known to us, i.e. 
that John does not see well does not follow from any (known) set of relevant 
propositions. This option seems to be supported by the infelicity of sentences where such a reason exists and is explicitly stated, as in (24) and (25):
(24)  #I can’t go with Mary to the movies. I have a cataract. I happen not to see 
well.
(25)  #The ilter in our dishwasher is a bit broken. That’s why the dishwasher 
happens to be very noisy.
However, consider (26), and (27): 
(26)   I can’t go with Mary to the movies. I happen not to see well. I have a 
cataract.
(27)   Our dishwasher happens to be very noisy. It’s because the ilter is a bit 
broken.
Crucially, these sentences are ine, and clearly much better than (24)-(25), 
although the cause for the matrix sentence is known, and even made explicit, 
though in this case after the utterance of the sentence with happens to. In fact, we ind cases like this with BP generics as well:
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(28)  Young adults as well as young children happen to be effortless sufferers mainly because they very easily have conidence in other folks. 5 
(29)  Teenagers happen to be desperate for capital. After all, cars and trucks, dates, 
along with college are usually not going to pay money for themselves! 6 
The felicity of sentences like (26)-(29), then, shows that a sentence with 
happens to does not indicate that “p only in the actual world,” that “there is no 
reason for p” or even that “there is a reason for p, but it is not known.” Rather 
it seems to indicate that there is a reason for p, but that it is systematically not speciied in the context c to which p is added. That is, the speaker may know or 
not know this reason, but what is crucial is that prior to the utterance of p the “reason” is not speciied/salient in the context.A direction to make this intuition more precise is to assume that happens 
to is a circumstantial necessity operator, with a vague accessibility relation. That is, that uttering (21) (John happens not to see well) in a context c says that 
John does not see well is true in all worlds where John has a property S, where 
crucially, in c the choice of S has to be left vague, and unspeciied. Thus, in 
any context c where John happens not to see well is uttered there are multiple 
properties S which can be considered the relevant property such that having it will cause/lead John not to see well. 7
On the surface, this suggestion seems very weird: Our initial intuition 
about happens to was that it expresses the “opposite” of necessity operators 
like must/should. How then can we claim that it is a necessity operator?
The answer to this question is that the semantics of modal operators 
contains various components. Thus, various operators can be thought of as 
their “opposite,” when lacking even one of these components. In particular modal operators are usually speciied for modal force (so we get the necessity 
(∀w) vs possibility ($w) distinction), and for modal lavor (e.g. epistemic/
deontic), and what is most relevant to our point, they are taken to have 
5. http://kathleenannmontgomery.com/teen-chat-encouraging-online-cha6. http://mustsan.info/2011/10/the-greatest-on-the-net-jobs-for-teens/7. In this paper I take properties to be salient or (un)speciied in context, following e.g. Brennan’s 1993 work on circumstantial modality briely reviewed below, and represent them 
using contextually marked variables over properties. More recent work on covert restrictions 
(e.g. Kratzer 2004, 2009, Schwarzschild (2009)), does not use contextual variables of this 
sort, but rather tools from situation semantics (e.g. situation anchors and domain ixing functions). Given this approach, the vagueness of sentences with happens to would not 
result from the indeterminacy with respect to a property (“S”) of the individual denoted 
by the subject, but rather from the indeterminacy with respect to a situation described by a 
proposition of the form John has S in the context. A similar revision will be relevant for the analysis of descriptive BP generics discussed below. At this stage, however, I will continue 
to talk about salient vs unspeciied properties. 
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conversational background which is ixed in every context, by explicit “in view 
of” or contextual clues.Thus, for example, Kratzer (1981) assumes that when a is an expression 
of the form must β, “a proposition is expressed by an utterance of a, if there 
is one, and only one, conversational ground for this utterance” (p. 44). In case 
several conversational backgrounds are possible, the listener is supposed to 
accommodate which one the speaker has in mind. 8 This is what happens, for example, in Kratzer’s “trombone” example, where several modal bases are 
possible:
(30)   I cannot play the trombone - In view of my physical condition / my abilities 
in music / the physical condition of the trombone / the fact that the trombone 
has sunk in the sea…etc. 
Thus, it may well be that happens to is felt to be the opposite of must because, 
although it is a necessity operator too, its conversational background cannot be speciied by the context, and must stay vague. Roughly, then: x happens 
to P says that “In all worlds where x has a property S, x has P, where S is unspeciied.”Notice, though, that although S is unspeciied, it cannot be any arbitrary property. This is because the choice of S indirectly deines the accessibility relation (the way the worlds quantiied over are similar to the world of 
evaluation, w0). In particular, S holds of x in w0. For example, we will take (21) (John happens not to see well) to have the truth conditions in (31):
(31)   John happens not to see well is true in w0 in c iff in all worlds w? where John 
has a property S in a set of properties S, John does not see well, where 
 (a)  ∀S∈S: S(j) is true in w0, and
 (b)  for every context c, the choice of S in c remains vague, i.e. no speciic S in 
S is chosen over another in c. 
Component (a) makes the accessibility relation “realistic” (in Kratzer’s 1981 
terms). Hence, the truth of p in w0 follows without stipulation (thus John 
happens not to see well is correctly predicted to entail John does not see well). Component (b) says that the choice of S is vague in c. Since S indirectly determines the set of worlds quantiied over (“In all worlds where John has S, for an unspeciied S), we end up with a vague set of worlds, which, following 
supervaluationist approaches to vagueness (e.g. Kamp (1975) and Fine (1975)), 
can be modeled as a set of sets of worlds.
8. There are debates about whether this claim is also true for epistemic modals. Some 
theories assume that these are inherently vague, e.g. w.r.t. the identity of the holder of the relevant information (see von Fintel & Gillis (2009), see also MacFarlane (2011)). In our 
case, however, we propose that happens to is a circumstantial modal (see below), whose modal base chooses a speciic subset of the facts in the world. 
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In this sense, happens to is similar to Kadmon & Landman’s (1993) characterization of Gen as a domain vague operator. But K&L took Gen to be vague over the domain of individuals quantiied over, while happens to is vague over the worlds quantiied over.Finally, notice that in considering John happens not to see well we do not consider all worlds where some (unspeciied) proposition p, true in w0, holds, but rather all worlds where John has some (unspeciied) property S, 
true of him in w0. This makes the accessibility relation property level/being 
about a participant of the event, i.e. similar to root, or “circumstantial” modals 
(e.g. Kratzer 1981; Brennan 1993; Hacquard (to appear, (2010)). For example, Brennan (1993) analyzes (32), with circumstantial may, as in (33), where the modal base is keyed to some property of Joan:
(32)  Joan may
circumstantial
 vote in Racine’s mayoral elections.
(33)  In virtue of having the property of living in Racine and being registered to vote, Joan may vote in Racine’s mayoral elections.
There are three motivations for taking happens to to have a circumstantial 
nature. The irst has to do with type of reasoning. Hacquard (to appear) summarizes Kratzer’s approach to the epistemic/circumstantial distinctions as follows: “Circumstantial modality looks at the material conditions which cause or allow an event to happen; epistemic modality looks at the knowledge 
state of the speaker to see if an event is compatible with various sources of information available.” (p. 18).
In this sense, happens to seems to involve (unspeciied) circumstantial, and not epistemic reasoning. A sentence like (34), for example, does not seem 
to be stated “given the evidence”:
(34)   This tree happens to be very tall (not “Given the evidence”)
In addition, happens to is perfectly compatible with irst person pronouns, 
similar to sentences with circumstantial must and may, but unlike the epistemic 
versions of these modals:
(35)  a.  John / I must
circumstantial
 / may
circumstantial
 be very happy b.  John / # I must
epistemic
 / may
epistemic
 be very happy b.  John happens to / I happen to be very happy.
A second motivation concerns entailments with symmetric predicates. Brennan (1993) claims that since the accessibility relation of root modals (of which 
“circumstantial” is a subtype) is in the form of a property predicated of the subject (or another event participant, Hacquard (2010)), such modals block 
entailments with symmetric predicates. In contrast, epistemic modals, with 
“proposition level” accessibility relations, cannot block such entailments. This is illustrated in (36)- (37), for epistemic and circumstantial may:
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(36)  Epistemic may: mutual entailment: 
 a.  The governor may
epistemic
 shake hands with the prisoner. 
 b.  The prisoner may
epistemic
 shake hands with the governor.
(37) Root / circumstantial may: no mutual entailment: 
 a.  The governor may
deontic
 shake hands with the prisoner.
 b.  The prisoner may
deontic
 shake hands with the governor.
In this sense, happens to behaves like root modals (at least with agentive 
subjects):
(38)  Happens to: No mutual entailment: 9
 a.  The governor happened to shake hands with the prisoner.
 b.  The prisoner happened to shake hands with the governor.
Finally, Hacquard (2010) claims that whereas epistemic modals are relativized 
to speech time, circumstantial modals are relativized to the tense time:
(39)  a.  Mary had
epsitemic
 to be home.  b.  ‘Given what I know now, it must be the case that Mary was home then.’  c.  *‘Given what I knew then Mary had to be home.’
(40)  a.  Mary had
teleological
 to take the train.  b.  ‘Given Mary’s circumstances then, she had to take the train then.’  c.  *‘Given Mary’s circumstances now she had to take the train.’
In this sense, too, happens to patterns like circumstantial modals:
(41)  a. Mary happened to be on the train.   She happened to be on the train then, given (some unspeciied) property 
true of her then. *She happened to be on the train then, given (some unspeciied) property 
true of her now.
To conclude our discussion until now, happens to is a domain vague 
circumstantial necessity operator. It asserts that something about the denotation 
9. Interestingly, it happens to be the case is different, since it does not block the mutual 
entailments, e.g. (ia) and (b) entail each other:
(i)  a. It happens to be the case that the governor shook hands with the prisoner.
 b. It happens to be the case that the prisoner shook hands with the governor.
This may be because unlike happens to, it happens to be the case that has scope over the 
whole proposition. This, as well as other questions concerning the syntactic and semantic 
relation between happens to and it happens to be the case that, e.g. whether the former is a 
raising construction, will be left to further research.
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of the subject leads to the truth of the sentence, but we systematically don’t 
specify what this is (although we may know it). 10
The question we need to solve now is how can this characterization 
of happens to explain its compatibility with BP generics (those with bare plural subjects) and its incompatibility with IS generics (those with indeinite 
singular subjects). To understand this we will have to take a close look at the 
semantics of IS and BP generics.
3. The semantics and pragmatics of IS and BP generics
3.1. The similarities and differences between IS and BP generics
We will be concerned with minimal pairs as in (42a) and (42b):
(42)  a.  Dogs have 4 legs. / A dog has 4 legs. b.  Boys don’t cry. / A boy does not cry.
The main challenge in the analysis of IS and BP generics is the need to account 
simultaneously for both the strong similarities and the differences between 
them. In particular, on the one hand such IS and BP sentences share all the 
core properties of (characterizing) generics: Both express quasi-universal 
generalizations, support counterfactuals, and tolerate contextually irrelevant and exceptional entities in a similar way. For example, both do not get a generic interpretation in contexts as in (43) (cf. Krifka 1987; Krifka et al. 1995), and both are felicitous as generic in contexts as in (44) and (45) (Greenberg (2007)):
(43)   (There are lions and tigers in the cage.) #Lions are / #A lion is dangerous.
(44)   (There are professors and students in this university.) Professors / A 
professor wear(s) a tie.
(45)   (There are shirts and skirts in this shop.) Shirts / A shirt cost(s) only 20 NIS.
In addition, both types of generics tolerate exceptions in a similar way. For example, in considering both IS and BP sentences in (42a) we take the legitimate 
exceptions (those which do not falsify the generalization) to be “abnormal” in 
some sense, e.g. dogs which have some mutation, have undergone an accident, etc. (Asher & Morreau 1995; Pelletier & Asher 1997; McCarthy 1986; Drewery 1997; Eckardt 1999).
On the other hand, there have been various observations concerning 
differences between IS and BP generics. I will focus here on two types of 
10. Notice that I do not explicitly deine the relation between S and p as causal. Rather, 
following e.g. Brennan 1993, I derive the relation between S and p by requiring that p holds in all worlds where John has S.
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differences. First, the two types of generics are taken to have different “lavors”: IS generics express “analytic,” “deinitional,” generalizations, 
whereas BP generics can express both these, as well as more “descriptive,” inductive generalizations. For example, A dog has 4 legs is taken to express a deinitional/analytic claim about the number of legs that dogs have, whereas 
Dogs have 4 legs is taken to be “ambiguous”: It can express both this kind of analytic/deinitional generalization, as well as a descriptive generalization, 
typically based on watching many dogs with four legs.
Second, the felicity of IS sentences is considerably more restricted than 
that of BP generics. Here are three examples: IS, but not BP generics were said to be infelicitous with “nonessential” “accidental” properties (Lawler 1973; Burton Roberts 1977): 11
(46) a.  # A madrigal is popular. / # A room is square. / #A man is blond. 
 b.  Madrigals are popular. / Rooms are square. / Men are blond. 
IS, but not BP sentences are also infelicitous with subjects denoting “extremely unnatural properties,” as illustrated in (47) and (48):
(47) a.  #A Norwegian student with a name ending with “s” wears thick green socks. (odd as generic, ine as existential) b.  Norwegian students with names ending with “s” wear thick green socks. 
(48)  a.  A well-known forty-ive year old teacher does not cook on Monday afternoons. (odd as generic, ine as existential)  b.  Well-known forty-ive year old teachers do not cook on Monday 
afternoons.
Finally, IS, but not BP generics are infelicitous with episodic predicates, as illustrated in (49) and (50): 12
(49)  Italian restaurants are closed tonight. / Earthquakes are especially strong 
today. 
11. In fact, the term “nonessential” or “accidental” is not precise, as there are many 
felicitous IS sentences with such properties, e.g. (i), or (ii), which is false, but felicitous (see Greenberg 2003 for discussion. See also section 3 below):(i) A refrigerator costs about $1000(ii) A dog has 3 legs12. A further observation is that IS and BP also differ in the degree to which the exceptions can be speciied (Greenberg 2007). This observation was analyzed in Greenberg 2007 using two constraints on Kadmon & Landman’s 1993 domain vague restriction on Gen, and eventually led to the suggestion, reviewed below, that the vagueness of Gen concerns the restriction over worlds, and not the restriction over individuals. Going into this topic, 
however, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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(50)  #An Italian restaurant is closed tonight. 13 / # An earthquake is especially 
strong today.
3.2. A semantics for IS and BP generics and an intuitive explanation of 
their distinct interaction with happens to
There are various attempts to explain the IS/BP puzzle, e.g. Dobrovie Sorin & Laca 1996; Cohen 2004; Greenberg 2003, 2007; Mari 2008; Krifka 
(to appear). Most of these approaches attempt to account for the differences 
by assigning IS and BP generics two completely distinct representations. 
The disadvantage of this approach is that the strong similarities between the 
two types of generics are not (naturally) accounted for. In this paper I will concentrate on Greenberg’s (2003, 2007) approach which attempts to account 
simultaneously for the similarities and differences between IS and BP generics by assuming that they have the same basic (quantiicational, modal) semantic 
structure, but are compatible with two different accessibility relations, 
expressing two types of “law-likeness.”
In particular, both IS and BP sentences are taken to have the same basic 
semantic structure in (51): 14
(51)  ∀w? [w? is appropriately accessible from w0] → [∀x Pcont.norm.(x,w?) → 
Q(x,w?)]
  “In worlds accessible from w0, every contextually relevant and “normal” 
P individual is also a Q individual” (cf. e.g. Krifka et al. 1995 ; Chierchia 1995)
This structure accounts for the similarities noted above: The universal quantiier 
over individuals accounts for the “generalization over individuals” component. The universal quantiier over worlds accounts for the basic “nonaccidentalness” 
and counterfactual supporting property of such generics. The restriction 
(contextually relevant and “normal”) on the nominal P-property, accounts for 
the tolerance to contextually irrelevant and “abnormal” P entities. 15
What distinguishes IS and BP sentences is their distinct compatibility with the accessibility relation restricting the quantiication over worlds. But 
there are, in fact, two ways to think about this difference.
13. This sentence can only be felicitous if “tonight” is interpreted functionally, as 
e.g. “the night in which Italy’s independence day occurs”. For the BP counterpart no such 
functional interpretation is needed. The sentence can be felicitous even if there is no special 
information about “tonight”.
14. For simplicity I disregard here quantiication over situations / eventualities.
15. The restriction “normal” on the P property is used here in an intuitive sense. See Greenberg 2007 for a more detailed discussion of the content of this restriction.
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Given Greenberg (2003), the difference lies in whether or not there 
is an “in virtue of” property restricting the accessibility relation. According 
to this approach, IS generics can only express “in virtue of” generalizations, 
roughly asserting that in all worlds where every P individual has the “in virtue 
of” property, every (relevant and normal) P individual has the Q property. In 
contrast, BP generics can also express “descriptive” generalization, merely 
stating that “there is a pattern here,” with no “in virtue of” property in the 
semantic structure. 16In Greenberg (2007), on the other hand, I took the difference to lie in 
whether an “in virtue of” property is speciied or left vague. According to this 
approach, both IS and BP generics express “in virtue of” generalizations. With 
both we assume that Ps are nonaccidentally Qs in virtue of something about 
P. But whereas with IS generics, such an “in virtue of” property is taken to 
be “associated” with P (given shared knowledge/stereotypes/norms), and is salient/speciied in the context of utterance, with BP generics we can rely on 
inductive inferences, based on observations in w0, and thus we do not/cannot 
specify what this property is, and it is left vague. Thus, BP sentences can 
roughly assert that all (relevant and normal) Ps are Qs in virtue of something 
about P, which is left vague.
Before examining these two options more closely, let us turn back briely to observation, made above, that BP, but not IS generics are compatible 
with happens to (Dogs happen to/# A dog happens to have 4 legs). Given both Greenberg (2003) and (2007), we can now sketch a potential explanation 
for this observation: We suggested above that happens to is a domain 
vague (circumstantial) modal operator (“There is a property, true of the denotation of the subject, which causes it to have Q, but we don’t specify 
it”). This is incompatible with IS generics, where the “in virtue of” property is systematically salient/speciied, but is compatible with BP generics which allow no speciication of the “in virtue of” property, either because it does not exist in the semantic representation (Greenberg (2003)), or because it exists but is systematically left unspeciied/vague (Greenberg (2007)).
Let us have now a closer look at the truth conditions of IS and BP 
sentences. This will enable us, in section 4, to explain the distinct interaction 
of these two types of generics with happens to in a more precise way.
16. This approach was found to be productive for analyzing middles cross linguistically (Lekakou (2005)), Polish aspectual system (Klimek-Jankowska (2008), and genericity in Brazilian Portuguese (Muller (2003)). See also Prasada & Dillingham (2006, 2009) 
for potential experimental results supporting the distinction between “in virtue of” and 
“descriptive” generics.
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3.3. A closer look at the different truth conditions of IS and BP generics 
in Greenberg (2003, 2007)
We will start by examining the semantics of IS sentences more closely. Given both Greenberg (2003) and (2007), such sentences necessarily express 
“in virtue of” generalizations. For example, A dog has four legs or A boy does 
not cry necessarily assert that the generalization that “Every (relevant and 
normal) P individual has Q” is true in virtue of a certain property that every 
P member is assumed to have (e.g. “having a four legged genetic makeup” or 
“being tough”). Following Brennan’s (1993) approach, we quantify over all 
worlds in which every P member has a contextually salient property, SC, as in (52): 17
(52)  ∀w?[∀x P (x,w?) → SC (x,w?)] → [∀x Pcont.norm. (x,w?) → Q (x,w?)] (“In all worlds 
where all Ps have a contextually supplied property SC, all contextually relevant 
and normal Ps have Q”)
Since the “in virtue of” SC property determines the way the worlds quantiied 
over are similar to the actual world w0, it cannot be any arbitrary property. In particular, it is constrained by two “actual world” requirements. The irst, 
dictates that SC should be associated with P in w0. This holds iff ∀x P(x) → 
S(x) follows from known facts, norms, stereotypes, etc. in w0, i.e. iff this 
universal statement holds in all worlds which are epistemically or deontically or 
stereotypically, etc, accessible from w0. Among other things, this requirement 
accounts for the incompatibility of IS sentences with “extremely unnatural properties,” as in (53):
(53) #A Norwegian student whose name ends with “s” or “g” wears thick green socks.
Properties like being a Norwegian student whose name ends with “s” or “g” are 
considered “extremely unnatural” precisely because we do not associate any 
(nontrivial) properties with them, i.e. because given the general knowledge/stereotypes/norms, etc. we do not impute to them “suficiently regular” behavior (using Chierchia’s (1998) phrasing). Thus, since the “association 
with P” requirement fails, IS sentences with subject denoting such properties 
are infelicitous.
The second requirement on SC is that this property should be taken in 
w0 to be a reasonable causer for properties “of the sort” of Q. This requirement 
is imposed in order to distinguish between false-but-felicitous IS generics like 
(54a) and infelicitous ones like (54b):
17. See again footnote 7 concerning the position that domain restrictions do not contain 
“salient” properties, but anchor situations.
178 yael greenberg
(54) a. A dog has 3 legs.  b. #A man is blond
Both being a dog and being a man are “natural” properites. I.e. we associate 
(nontrivial) properties with both of them. However, although no property associated with being a dog is taken to reasonably cause having 3 legs, there is 
such a proprty which causes a property of this sort, i.e. which causes a having a certain number of legs (speciically, having 4 legs). In contrast, none of the 
properties associated with being a man is taken to be a reasonable causer for a speciic hair color (a property of the “sort of” being blond). Formally, a property 
S is taken to cause “sort of” a property of Q iff there is good possibility, from 
the point of view of w0, that [∀x S(x) → Q(x)] ∨ [∀x S(x) → ¬Q(x)], or put 
differently, if there is a good possibility that ∀x S(x) → Q?(x) holds, for some 
Q?∈ALTQ (cf. Cohen (2001; 2004)). Turning now to BP sentences, in Greenberg (2003) I proposed that unlike 
IS sentences, these can express both “in virtue of” as well as “descriptive” 
generalizations, with no “in virtue of” property. In this descriptive reading 
(typically a result of an inductive inference) such sentences merely assert that 
“there is a pattern here,” i.e. that the generalization is not limited to the actual P 
members, but expected to hold also for P members in nonfactual circumstances 
which are similar to ours (where “similarity” is vague, cf. Lewis (1973)). This 
is captured in (55):
(55) ∀w? [w?∈{w0} ∪ {w?: w?Rmaxw0}] → [∀x Pcont.norm(x,w?) → Q (x,w?)] 
 “In all worlds in the union set of w0 and the set of worlds which are maximally 
similar to w0 (except for what is needed to allow for the existence of different 
or nonactual P members) every contextually relevant and normal member of P 
has Q”
In Greenberg (2007), on the other hand, I made a preliminary suggestion 
according to which all (I-) generics say that the generalization holds “in 
virtue of” some property of P. The idea here is that whenever we say that a 
generalization of the form “Ps are Qs/A P is a Q” is nonaccidental, this is 
because we think there is something about P which leads to Q. Thus, even 
when we say Norwegian students whose name end with “s” or “g” wear thick 
green socks we believe that there is something about such Norwegian students which makes them wear thick green socks. Given this idea, the structure of all 
(I-) generics will be as (56):
(56) ∀w?[∀x P (x,w?) → S (x,w?)] → [∀x Pcont.norm. (x,w?) → Q (x,w?)] 
 (“In all worlds where all Ps have S, all contextually relevant and normal Ps have 
Q”)
Under this approach the difference between IS and BP generics lies in two 
points regarding the “in virtue of” S property:
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The irst point concerns the relation between the “in virtue of” property 
(S) and the nominal property (P): With IS sentences, S is “associated” with P in 
w0, i.e. the claim that all Ps have S should follow from known facts/stereotypes/
norms etc. we have in w0. In contrast, with BP sentences no such “association” 
is needed. Thus, for example, when uttering Norwegian students whose name 
end with “s” or “g” wear thick green socks we assume that there is something that all Norwegian students whose name ends with “s” or “g” have in w0 and that it is this property which leads to wearing thick green socks. Crucially, 
however, this does not follow from an existing, shared body of knowledge, 
stereotypes or norms. That is, there is no guarantee that it holds in other worlds 
which are epistemically, deontically, stereotypically, etc. accessible from w0. 
The same holds also for BP sentences like Barns are red, or even for Boys 
don’t cry under the descriptive reading. Thus, in all BP sentences expressing 
descriptive generalization, we assume that the generalization holds due to a 
property that all of P members have in the actual world.The second point concerns the speciicity/vagueness of S (and can 
be perhaps derived from the previous point, see next subsection): With IS 
sentences, the speaker has the “in virtue of” S property in mind, and the listener 
is supposed to accommodate it. In many cases such a property is easy to 
accommodate, as it exists in the shared body of knowledge/norms/stereotypes. 
In other cases we need explicit contextual support in order to give the value of S. This is what happens in cases like (57):
(57) An accountant in this place hardly pays taxes. 
 (in virtue of being covered by the local legislation / of being deeply dishonest / 
of earning almost nothing…) 
Here there are several potential “in virtue of” properties. But in uttering such 
a sentence in a context c, the assumption is that the speaker has one such “in 
virtue of” property in mind, and the listener is supposed to accommodate it, in a very similar way to what happens with Kratzer’s I cannot play the trombone 
example.
In contrast, in uttering a BP sentence, no S property needs to be speciied. E.g. one can utter (58) as a purely descriptive generalization:
(58) Accountants in this place hardly pay taxes. 
Under the descriptive reading (58) says that “All (normal) accountants in this place hardly pay taxes in virtue of some unspeciied property they have in the actual world.” Consequently, the listener is not supposed to accommodate a speciic “in virtue of” property.To summarize, given Greenberg (2007) approach, IS sentences have the semantic structure in (59), whereas BP sentences can have both structures in (59) and in (60):
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(59)   ∀w?[∀x P (x,w?) → SC (x,w?)] → [∀x Pcont.norm. (x,w?) → Q (x,w?)] 
  Requirements: 
 a. There is good possibility in w0 that [∀x S(x) → Q(x)] ∨ [∀x S(x) → ¬Q(x)] 
 b. ∀w? w?R
epistemic / normative / stereotypical
 w0 → [∀x P (x,w?) → SC (x,w?)], where S is 
salient in the context c
  “In all worlds where every P individual has a contextually salient property 
S, every relevant and normal P individual has Q”—
  Where (a) S is taken in w0 to be a reasonable causer for properties of the sort 
of Q and (b) “Every P individual has S” follows from a set of known facts / 
norms / stereotypes in w0.
(60)  ∀w?[∀x P (x,w?) → S∈S (x,w?)] → [∀x Pcont.norm. (x,w?) → Q (x,w?)] 
  Requirements: 
 a. There is good possibility in w0 that [∀x S(x) → Q(x) ] ∨ [∀x S(x) → 
¬Q(x) ] 
 b. ∀S S∈S → ∀x P (x,w0) → S (x,w0)
  “In all worlds where every P individual has S, a property in a set of properties S (not speciied in c), every relevant and normal P individual 
has Q”—
  Where (a) S is taken in w0 to be a reasonable causer for properties of the sort of Q and (b) All properties S in S hold of every P member in w0.
Thus, on the descriptive reading of BP sentences, we end up with Gen whose 
restriction over worlds is vague: There are multiple sets of worlds that the universal quantiication can range over, namely those in which “every P has S” 
holds, for the different choices of S.
3.4. The source of the difference between IS and BP generics
Assuming that indeed IS and BP generic sentences differ in their compatibility with the structure in (59) and (60), we still need to explain 
how these two different semantic structures can be derived from the different semantics of the IS and BP subjects. A direction to answering this question can be based on Krifka’s (to appear) insight according to which “When expressing 
a generalization based on a count noun, speakers have a choice between indeinite singulars (predicates that apply to atomic entities), and bare plurals 
(predicates that apply to sum individuals).”
Krifka uses this difference to argue that BP sentences can make generalizations about the world, whereas IS ones can make “deinitional” 
generalizations, about interpretation of linguistic expressions. However we 
may try and use this insight to account for the difference in the compatibility of IS and BP generics with the structures in (59) and (60) above.
In particular, suppose IS generics are indeed based on statements which 
are true for a singular individual. How can we move from considering a singular 
individual to a generalization? Intuitively, we can only do that if we already 
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assume that having the nominal P property means exhibiting suficiently regular behavior (similar to what Chierchia (1998) claims w.r.t. kinds), that is, if we 
already have some assumptions: knowledge/stereotypes/laws, etc. concerning 
this nominal property, i.e. if we associate other (nontrivial) properties with it.
If, on the other hand, P is taken to be “unnatural” in that we do not take 
it to exhibit regular behavior, i.e. we do not associate other properties with 
it, or if no property associated with P is a reasonable causer for one of the alternatives of the Q properties, then we won’t tend to express a generalization 
(“all (normal) Ps are Qs”) based on considering a single individual. Thus, in 
stating IS generics, an “in virtue of” property is typically one which is already 
present and salient in the context of utterance.In contrast to IS sentences, given Krifka’s idea, BP generics are based 
on considering pluralities (sum individuals). Thus, they can also express 
“descriptive” generalization, based on purely inductive inferences: observing 
several instances with P property having the Q property, and claiming that “there is something about having P which leads to having Q.” Crucially, in such cases we can make a generalization even if we didn’t assume before considering the members of P, that P manifests a “suficiently regular behaviour,” i.e. even if 
we do not already associate (nontrivial) properties with this P. Hence no S is 
presupposed to be associated with P, and to be present/salient in the common 
ground. So, S can remain vague.
Typically, then, with BP sentences whose IS counterparts are 
infelicitous (Barns are red/Norwegian students whose name ends with “s” or 
“g” wear thick green socks), and which are thus unambiguously descriptive, 
the “in virtue of” S property is not salient in the context to which the sentence 
is added, and hence remains vague, so we end up with multiple possibilities for what S is, and hence with multiple sets of worlds quantiied over.
4. Back to happens to with IS and BP generics
We are now in a position to turn back to the interaction between 
happens to and generic sentences. We start from considering the felicity and 
interpretation of BP generics with happen to, illustrated again in (61):
(61)  a.  Dogs happen to have 4 legs
 b.  Barns happen to be red c.  Norwegian students whose name ends with “s” or “g” happen to wear thick 
green socks
Above we stated the accessibility relation of “descriptive” reading of BP 
generics and of happens to in very similar terms. In particular, the semantics 
of John happen to Q (as in John happens not to see well) is schematically 
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given again in (62), and the two potential semantic structure of BP generics are schematically given in (63a) and (63b) respectively:
(62)   John happens to Q:
  ∀w? [S∈S ∧ S(j, w?)] → Q(j,w?)
  where ∀S S∈S, → S(j, w0) where no speciic S is chosen in c, 
(63)  a.  ∀w?[∀x P (x,w?) → SC (x,w?)] → [∀x Pcont.norm. (x,w?) → Q (x,w?)]
  (“In all worlds where every P member has S—a contextually salient 
property associated with P—every (relevant and normal) P member has 
Q”) 
 b.  ∀w?[∀x P (x,w?) → S∈S (x,w?)] → [∀x Pcont.norm. (x,w?) → Q (x,w?)] 
  (“In all worlds where every P member has S—a property true of every P 
in w
0
 which is unspeciied in c—every (relevant and normal) P member 
has Q”)
Sentences like (61a-c) result from an interaction between the semantics of 
happens to in (62), and the “descriptive” reading of Gen in (63b). In such a 
case, there are, in fact, three potential ways for the two operators to interact: (A) Stacking of happens to above Gen, (B) Stacking of Gen above Happens to and (C) Modal concord. Examining these options we will see now that option A is problematic, option B is possible, though not very plausible, and option C is the most plausible and non-problematic. Let us examine each such case 
more closely:Option A, stacking of happens to above Gen is illustrated in (64): 
(64)   Happens to (Dogs have 4 legs)
  ∀w? s.t. S? ∈S holds of….?
  w?∈∀w?[∀x P (x,w?) → S?∈S (x,w?)] → [∀x dog cont.norm. (x,w?) → has 4 
legs (x,w?)]
Notice that in the generic statement, the universal quantiication over individual dogs (in boldface) is under the scope of the universal quantiication over worlds. Hence it is not clear that the unspeciied S? property introduced 
by happens to can have access to the individual variable, and be predicated 
of individual dogs. It seems, then, that this option does not yield a felicitous 
structure.
Option B, stacking of Gen above Happens to: seems possible, but quite restricted. Intuitively it yields the reading that “In virtue of (an unspeciied) S 
true of Ps, every P happens to be Q.” This is suitable, for example, in the scenario described in section 1 above, where we meet several Supreme Court judges, each of them happens to have an odd ID number. At some point we can conclude that a general property of Supreme Court judges (which holds of 
them in virtue of some property that they have) is that each of them happens to 
have an odd sID number. This is illustrated in (65) and (66):
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(65)   Supreme Court judges [happen to have an odd ID number]
(66)   ∀w?[∀x SCJ (x,w?) → S∈S (x,w?)] → 
   [∀x SCJcont.norm. (x,w?) → [∀w?S?∈S (x,w?) → has an odd ID number (x,w?)]]
This is paraphrased as in (67), and yields the counterfactual in (68):
(67)   “In all worlds where every individual Supreme Court judge has (an unspeciied property) S, every contextually relevant and normal Supreme Court judge is s.t. in all worlds where such a judge has (an unspeciied 
property) S?, it has an odd ID number” 18
(68)   If this were a Supreme Court judge, it would happen to have an odd ID 
number too. 
However, in section 2 above we saw that in the normal case, the counterfactuals 
that BP generics with happens to support are standard counterfactuals (without 
happens to). For example, (69) naturally supports (70) and not (71):
(69)  Dogs happen to have 4 legs.
(70)  If this were a dog it would (probably) have 4 legs too.
(71)  If this were a dog it would (probably) happen to have 4 legs too.
I propose that we get such standard counterfactuals because the salient reading 
of happens to + Gen is not a stacked reading, as in options B and C, but a 
modal concord reading.
In general, modal concord readings (e.g. Geurts and Huitink 2006; Anand & Brasoveanu 2010) occur where a modal adverb modiies another 
modal operator (often a modal auxiliary), with the same modal force (necessity/possibility) and the same “modal lavour” (e.g. epistemic, deontic etc.). In such 
cases we can (and sometimes must) get an interpretation as though there is, in fact, only one such modal operator, instead of two. (72) illustrate such a reading. In (73) the modal concord reading is blocked since the modal lavor 
of the adverb and modal auxiliary do not match:
(72)  We can
Deontic
 legitimately
Deontic
 deny your request.
(73)  #John might
Epistemic
 legitimately
Deontic
 be home 19 
18. Notice that this reading is correctly predicted not to work with IS generics: There 
is no property associated in w0 with being a Supreme Court judge, which can be taken as a 
reasonable causer in w0 of a property of the sort of “happens to have an odd social security 
number” (cf. #A man is blond).19. Anand & Brasoveanu (2010), examples (2a) and (2b).
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There have been various ideas about how such concord readings are derived (see Anand & Brasoveanu (2010) for an overview). In this paper I will adopt Anand & Brasoveanu’s own suggestion that when the modal adverb modiies the modal auxiliary, they both apply to the same matrix proposition, as in (74):
(74)  ?adverb modal?(f
modal base
)(p)=1 iff ?adverb?(f)(p)=1 and ?modal?(f)(p)=1
Anand & Brasoveanu further propose that the redundancy created by using the same kind of modal quantiication twice on the same proposition leads to strengthening of the modalized statement. For example, (72) seems stronger 
than We can deny your request.
We can now turn back to the interaction between happens to and Gen 
(as in Dogs happen to have 4 legs). Given our analysis of happens to and of “descriptive” Gen, here we can get modal concord as well. This can be seen clearly when we decompose Gen into a universal quantiier over accessible 
worlds which has in its scope a universal statement over individuals. In such 
a case, happens to and the modal part of Gen have the same modal force (universal), and the same modal lavor/accessibility relation: a domain vague circumstantial operator, (“In virtue of an unspeciied property”). Both these 
modal operators apply to the same matrix proposition, namely to the universal statement over individuals (“All (relevant and normal) P individuals have Q”). This is schematically illustrated in (75), and more speciically for Dogs happen 
to have 4 legs in (76):
(75) ?Happens to Gen
lw
 ? (F
modal base
) (∀x Pcont.norm. (x) → Q(x)) = 1 iff 
 Happens to (F
modal base
) (∀x Pcont.norm. (x) → Q(x)) = 1 and
 Gen
w
 ( F
modal base
) (∀x Pcont.norm. (x) → Q(x)) = 1
(76)  ∀w?[∀x dog (x,w?) → S∈S (x,w?)] → [∀x dogcont.norm. (x,w?) → has 4 legs (x,w’)] ∧
 ∀w?[∀x dog (x,w?) → S∈S (x,w?)] → [∀x dogcont.norm. (x,w?) → has 4 legs (x,w?)]
This kind of proposal can account for the following facts. First, Dogs happen 
to have 4 legs supports If this were a dog it would have 4 legs as well (without 
happens to). This is because there is eventually only one modal quantiier operating in this structure. Notice that this modal has to be Gen
w
 (and not 
happens to) since the universal-over-individuals structure is only introduced because of Gen.
Second, IS sentences are infelicitous with happens to, since no modal 
concord can occur. In such a case the semantic structure of happens to in (62) above interacts with the version of Gen in (63a). Although the modal force is 
the same (universal), the two operators have a different lavor (accessibility 
relation): Happens to requires an unspeciied S property, while Gen with IS generics requires a speciied and salient S property. Notice that, to the extent that this modal concord analysis is correct, this indicates that the modal lavors 
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restrictions on modal concord are more ine-grained than the ones assumed in 
the literature (which concentrate on deontic/epistemic kinds of distinctions).
Third, when applied to BP sentences whose IS counterparts are felicitous 
(Dogs have 4 legs), happens to disambiguates these sentences, turning them into descriptive only, and their “deinitional”/“analytic”-like lavor disappears. 
This is, again, since modal concord is blocked for the nondescriptive reading (which uses a speciied and associated S property).Finally, as with other cases of modal concord, the effect of happens to on BP generics can be seen as strengthening: For example, the “descriptive/
inductive” nature of Barns happen to be red is stronger than that of Barns are 
red.
5. Summary 
The claims made in this paper about the semantics of happens to, of 
IS and BP generics, and about their interactions can be now summarized as 
follows:
 a. Happens to: We proposed that happens to is a necessity 
circumstantial operator with a vague accessibility relation (i.e. a vague set of worlds quantiied over).
 b. Generics:
 i. We looked at the idea that both IS and BP generics express “in 
virtue of” generalizations: In both we say “All Ps have Q in virtue 
of something about P.”
 ii. More formally, given this idea, both IS and BP generics can be 
thought of as generalizations over individuals (and situations) in the scope of a necessity circumstantial operator (a universal quantiier 
over worlds where every P member has an “in virtue of” property 
S).
 iii. The difference between IS and BP generics lies in whether the 
“in virtue of” S-factor is “associated” with the P property or not, consequently, in whether it is salient/speciied in the context of utterance (for IS generics) or can remain unspeciied and vague. iv. Following ideas in Krifka (to appear), we hypothesize that the 
difference between IS and BP sentences results from the fact that 
the conditions for deriving a nonaccidental generalization based on 
predication of a singular individual (as with IS generics) are tighter 
than when based on predication of plural individuals. In particular, former kinds of generalizations are only justiied if there is already 
enough background knowledge concerning general patterns true of 
the singular property.
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 c. Happens to + Generics: happens to and the modal component of Gen
descriptive
 express the same modal operation: with the same modal force and “lavour.”
 i. We thus assumed that the salient interpretation of BPs happen to be 
Q results from modal concord. ii. No such reading is possible for IS generics, since the vagueness of 
S in the accessibility relation of happens to and the speciicity of S in the accessibility relation of Gen of IS sentences clash and block 
the concord reading.
The analysis presented in this paper has more general implications 
towards the understanding of the assumed “nonaccidentalness” property of (I-) generics. In the genericity literature one often inds the claim that generic 
sentences express nonaccidental generalizations. While I strongly believe that this claim is correct, I think it is in fact used to capture two distinct ideas. First, 
one can use this claim to merely say that generic sentences assert that a certain 
generalization is not accidental, i.e. that this generalization is not limited to 
the actual set of circumstances (the actual world), but is expected to be true in other potential circumstances (other possible worlds) as well. A second, stronger, use of this claim is that generic sentences “relect” nonaccidental 
generalizations, i.e. report nonaccidental patterns, which are already marked 
as law-like in the common ground.
Interestingly, these two uses of the claim that “generics express 
nonaccidental generalizations” are manifested with two different linguistic constructions: The irst use corresponds to the semantics of BP generics under 
the “descriptive” reading: Here we merely assert that the a generalization is 
nonaccidental. The second use correspond the semantics given in this paper 
to IS generics: they felicitously assert that a certain generalization is true 
only if this generalization is of the sort which can be plausibly derived from 
knowledge, norms or stereotypes of existing patterns.
In the beginning of the paper we asked whether the felicitous interaction 
of BP generics and happens to indicates that “nonaccidentalness” should not be considered anymore a core property of (I-) generics. Given our discussion so far, the answer to this question seems negative. A sentence with happens to 
does not say that a statement is accidental, only that the “in virtue of” property behind it is unspeciied, or left vague. Descriptive generics convey a similar type of information. Combined with happens to, then, descriptive generics do not become ‘accidental’. Rather they continue to assert that the generalization they express is nonaccidental (as in the irst use of the claim above), and the 
vagueness/indeterminacy of the “in virtue of” property is only strengthened.
Acknowledgements: I would like to thanks the participants of Genius III for 
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résumé
Cet article entreprend de clariier la nature de la « law-likness » ou « non-
accidentalité » qu’expriment, selon l’opinon courante, les phrases génériques. 
Pour ce faire, il examine les interactions des ces phrases génériques avec une 
construction qui semble exprimer « l’accidentalité », à savoir la construction 
en happens to (comme dans John happens not to see well, fr. il se trouve que 
John ne voit pas bien). En particulier, il s’avère que les génériques avec un sujet 
pluriel nu (génériques BP, comme Dogs have four legs, fr. les chiens ont quatre 
pattes), mais pas les génériques avec un sujet indéini singulier (génériques IS, 
comme A dog has four legs, fr. un chien a quattre pattes), sont compatibles avec 
cette construction (cf. Dogs happen to have four legs vs #A dog happens to have 
four legs). J’analyse happens to comme un opérateur de nécessité à domaine 
vague, c’est-à-dire un quantiicateur universel sur les mondes dont la restriction 
(le domaine de mondes sur lequel opère la quantiication) est systématiquement 
vague. À la suite de Greenberg (2003, 2008), je propose qu’un certain nombre 
de différences distributionnelles et interprétatives entre les génériques IS et BP 
peuvent être attribuées au fait que bien que les deux ont la même structure 
sémantique quantiicationnelle modale de base, la restriction des mondes est 
nécessairement précise dans le premier type de génériques, alors qu’elle peut 
être vague dans le second. La compatibilité des génériques BP avec happens to 
est ainsi analysée comme un cas de concordance modale.
mots-clés
Généricité, non-accidentalité, vague, modalité, indéini singulier, pluriel nu, 
happens to.

